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Abstract
We propose four arguments favoring the idea that medical eﬀectiveness, adult
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11 Introduction
Adult longevity, as measured for example by the conditional life expectancy at age 10, is
undoubtedly positively correlated with income per person. This is true both over time
and across countries. Figure 1 plots this relationship for Sweden from 1751 until today.
The dotted line represents life expectancy at age 10 and is measured in years on the
right axis,1 while the solid line represents the logarithm of income per capita in constant
dollars and is measured on the left axis.2 The trends in the two series are amazingly
similar. Up to the 1820s we have stagnation in both series, then a slight upward trend
after the Napoleonic wars is discernible, but at a very modest level (averaging around
half a percent a year for income per capita). There is an increasing growth trend though
and, after 1850, average growth rates in income per capita start to exceed the 1 percent
level.
Figure 1: Life expectancy at age 10 and income per capita in Sweden
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This positive relation between adult longevity and growth is also found is a cross-section
of countries. Figure 2 plot this relationship for the year 2000. Life expectancy at age
10 is taken from the life tables provided by the World Health Organization (and results
1Already in 1749, Sweden established a public agency with a responsibility for producing population
statistics. These statistics were based on population records kept by the parish priests of the Swedish
Lutheran church. Thanks to this eﬀort we have access to detailed data of high quality on how mortality
and fertility changed as Sweden developed from a poor agricultural country in the 18th century into a
rich, highly industrialized country in the 20th century (Hofsten and Lundstr¨ om 1976).
2Historical estimates of GDP per capita in Sweden are available from several sources. Back to 1861
they all build on work done by Lindahl, Dahlgren, and Kock (1937) but lately these estimates have
been extended backwards by Edvinsson (2005) all the way back to 1720.
2from model life tables for certain countries), while GDP per capita is measured using
the World Development Indicators. The relation between the two variables is also very
strong; the countries lying much below the regression line are those which are strongly
hit by the AIDS epidemics.
Figure 2: Life expectancy at age 10 and income per capita across countries (year 2000)
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This strong relationship is obviously very important to understand the processes that
led the various countries through the transition from stagnation to sustained growth (in-
dustrial revolution), but is also key to improve the design of today’s development policy.
Unfortunately, the correlations highlighted above do not say anything on the direction of
causality. Did improvements in longevity simply follow better living conditions, and, at
best, reinforced the growth process, or, on the contrary, did adult longevity rise before
the industrial revolution and played a crucial role in its release?
It is undisputed that longevity was positively inﬂuenced by standard of livings. However,
the question on whether longevity played a key role in the industrial revolution is dis-
puted. The two views mentioned above are present in the literature. The view according
to which longevity improvements reinforce growth but were not key is illustrated by the
following citation:
It appears that the industrial demand for human capital (...) provided the
inducement for investment in education and the associated reduction in fer-
tility rates, whereas the prolongation of life may have re-enforced and com-
plemented this process. (Galor 2005)
The alternative according to which longevity played a key role was earlier defended by
the same author:
3Changes in mortality can serve as the basis for a uniﬁed model that describes
the complete transition from the Malthusian Regime to the Modern Growth
Regime. Consider the eﬀect of an initial reduction in mortality (due to
an exogenous shock to health technology or to standards of living). The
eﬀect of lower mortality in raising the expected rate of return to human
capital investments will nonetheless be present, leading to more schooling
and eventually to a higher rate of technological progress. This will in turn
raise income and further lower mortality...(Galor and Weil 1999)
In this paper we defend the idea that longevity is a key factor. For this purpose we will
provide four arguments using various data sets: Geneva and Venice longevity data before
the Industrial Revolution (Section 3), mortality data of English aristocrats (Section 4),
evidence on the rise in medical knowledge (Section 5), and height of Swedish soldiers
(Section 6). Before going into these details we brieﬂy survey various theories which
formally examine mechanisms through which longevity aﬀects growth (Section 2).
2 Theories
Theories accounting for a positive eﬀect of adult longevity on income per capita can be
classiﬁed into four categories.
We label the ﬁrst theory the Ben Porath mechanism, following Ben-Porath (1967)’s
seminal contribution. According to this theory, the return to investment in education
depends on the length of time during which education will be productive, i.e. a longer
active life makes initial investment in human capital more proﬁtable. Longer education
makes future income higher. Provided that human capital is an engine of growth, this
may in turn sustain permanent income growth. The ﬁrst authors to put this argument
at work in an endogenous growth model are de la Croix and Licandro (1999). Further
contributions are in Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002), Soares (2005) and
Cervellati and Sunde (2005). Quantiﬁcations of the eﬀect can be found in de la Croix,
Lindh, and Malmberg (2008) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2008).
A second mechanism argues that longer lives give stronger incentives to save and in-
vest. Let us label this the life-cycle hypothesis. Following the intuition of the life-cycle
hypothesis, Nicolini (2004) claim that the increase in adult life expectancy must have
implied less farmer impatience and could have caused more investment in nitrogen stock
and land fertility, the increase in agricultural land, and higher production per acre in
18th century England.
Beyond the ”horizon” eﬀect caused by longer lives, there might also be a healthiness
eﬀect. Healthier children have an increased capacity to absorb human capital (Hazan
and Zoabi 2006).
The last mechanism is based on the fact that, keeping given fertility and migration, lower
mortality increases the size of the population. Increased population density foster the
4eﬃciency of the transmission of human capital (Lagerloef 2003). Increased population
growth may also fasten the advancement of skill-biased technologies (Weisdorf 2004).
Beyond these theoretical approaches to the interaction between longevity trends and
long-run income growth prospects, there is another tradition which has an agnostic
view of the mechanisms actually in place; it is the demographic dividend literature
which analyzes the empirical relationships between demographic variables and growth
in income per capita in recent data (see Bloom and Williamson (1998)). In this line,
de la Croix, Lindh, and Malmberg (2009) consider a demographically-based statistical
growth model estimated on global post-war growth data to study whether it can account
for the long-term growth process that can be observed in the Swedish data. The global
model estimates show a drift in the most productive activity period with life expectancy.
The peak productivity shifts from around 30 years of age when life expectancy is low to
an age around 50 for actual life expectancies in developed and emerging economies. The
model is used to backcast Swedish economic growth back to 1750. The backcast shows
that the statistical model can account not only for recent changes in per capita income
but also for the long-term process of Swedish economic development since the mid 19th
century.
3 Geneva and Venice Data3
To assess the role of the decline in mortality in the economic take-oﬀ of Western Europe,
it is necessary to distinguish the ﬂuctuations of infant mortality from the reduction in
the mortality of adults. Infant mortality ﬂuctuates strongly as a function of economic
and sanitary conditions, as children will be the ﬁrst to suﬀer from bad crops and diseases.
Child mortality has a major inﬂuence on the estimation of life expectancy at birth. Since
improvements in infant mortality have arisen very late in the nineteenth century, it is
not surprising that life expectancy at birth shows little trend before that time. Using the
data built by Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1989) for England, life expectancy at birth peaks
in England at 39.5 years around the year 1575, then drops to 33 years in the period
1670-1750, and rises again and reaches its 1575 level in 1820. Then, it remains steady at
40 years until 1850. However, this absence of large improvement before 1850, due to a
high and volatile infant mortality, hides more subtle improvements on the front of adult
mortality. We shall eliminate the eﬀects of this volatility on life expectancy estimations
to get a much better picture of the evolution of adult mortality.
To study how adult mortality evolved over time, we need cohort life tables at diﬀerent
periods. We have found two data sets adapted to our purposes. The ﬁrst one is from
Perrenoud (1978) who constructed life tables from 1625 to 1825 on the basis of a wide
nominative study in Geneva (Switzerland). The second set is built by Beltrami (1951).
He uses parish registers to reconstitute age-group dynamics of the Venetian population
over the period 1600-1790. Complete life tables are available for the cohorts born between
3This section borrows some material from Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2003).
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1600 and 1700; for the cohorts born after 1700 we only have partial tables, since the
study ends in 1790. Survival laws are normalized to 1000 at age 10. By doing so, we
eliminate the shifts generated by changes in infant mortality and concentrate on the
mortality of adults. Figures 3 and 4 display the survival laws of selected cohorts. These
data sets are available from the author upon request.
The Geneva’s picture, Figure 3, displays upward shifts of the curve from one generation
to the next. The drop in the death rates essentially concerns the ages 40 to 65. Notice
that the end of the curve does not move much, reﬂecting that the gains in longevity do
not translate into a rise in the maximum attainable age. Very few persons live longer
than 85.
In Figure 4 we ﬁnd the same trend in Venice’s data, that have been built from diﬀerent
sources. The lower curve represents the survival law for the generation born in 1600-
1610. The dip in the curve at the age of 30 reﬂects the dramatic plague experienced by
the city in 1630. The data from this period are thus rather pessimistic about longevity,
as they take into account the damage caused by these particularly vigorous epidemics.
To have a more prudent view of the improvement in longevity, we can compare the
generation born in 1630-1640 to the one born in 1710-1720. There is no plague during
this century in Venice (except the one of 1630 that only aﬀects infant mortality of the
generation 1630-40). Here again, the gains in longevity are concentrated on the working
ages, and life expectancy at 10 increases signiﬁcantly over the period.
The main ﬁnding of Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2003) that the observed
changes in adult mortality from the last quarter of the seventeenth century to the ﬁrst
quarter of the eighteenth century described in Figures 3 and 4 played a fundamental
role in launching modern growth. The decline in adult mortality induced an increase in
the growth rate of around 70% of the increase estimated by Maddison. This study thus
6Figure 4: Survival probabilities – Venice
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promotes the view that the early decline in adult mortality is responsible for a large part
of the acceleration of growth at the dawn of the modern age.
The debate concerning the causes of the initial decline in mortality is not settled yet.
The classical view is that pre-industrial mortality was reduced when nutritional stan-
dards were improved. Perrenoud (1985) and Fridlizius (1985) claim that human factors
(nutrition, medicine, sanitary conditions and economy) did not play a prominent role
in the ﬁrst phase of the process. Instead, the decline in mortality should be found
elsewhere; it can be connected to changes in immunology and/or improvement in the
climate.
Could the shifts of the survival curve witnessed in Geneva and Venice be generalized
to the whole Europe? We do not know, but at least not probably to England. In
Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Peeters (2007), we estimate that mortality improvements
account for only one sixth of the rise in literacy and growth in England over the period
1530-1860. This is small especially compared to the important role is was supposed to
play in Nicolini (2004) and Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2003).
Looking ﬁrst at the raw data, Figure 5 compares the survival function in England as
estimated by Wrigley et al. (1997) with the one for Geneva from Figure 3. Again we have
normalized the series to 1000 at the age of 10 to concentrate on the mortality of adults.
During the early seventeenth century (data for 1625-49), surviving was more likely in
England than in Geneva, specially for the ages 35-65. English longevity was remarkably
high for this period. Fifty years later, mortality in Geneva has dropped substantially,
becoming lower compared to England. More surprisingly, English mortality has in fact
increased over this period. This diﬀerent evolution in mortality is probably due to the
sharp rise in urbanization in England. At that time, big cities were unhealthy places.
According to Bairoch, Batou, and Ch` evre (1988), the population of London went from
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50 thousands in 1500 to 948 thousands in 1800, while it grew only from 12 thousands
to 25 thousands in Geneva over the whole period. In the eighteenth century, ﬁnally,
survival probabilities increased at all ages in both England and Geneva. Over the two
centuries, the improvements in longevity were steady in Geneva, while they came quite
late in England probably because of the fast urbanization process. This is why, in the
quantitative exercise of Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Peeters (2007), mortality reductions
play a role only in the eighteenth century.
4 English Aristocrats4
Another way to search for changes in mortality that could have preceded the Industrial
Revolution is to look for forerunners in mortality decline. Even if little is visible at the
aggregate level, longevity improvements beneﬁting speciﬁc groups could have sparked a
modiﬁcation in their behavior along the lines proposed in Section 2.
It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd data on mortality rates or life expectancy by income groups for the
pre-industrial period. We gather here some evidence for England as a whole, combin-
ing sources from Hollingsworth (1977) and Wrigley et al. (1997), and for two cities in
continental Europe, based on surveys by Perrenoud (1975) and Bardet (1983).
Starting with England, Figure 6 compares life expectancy at birth of the average person
(from parish records (Wrigley et al. 1997)) with that of the English aristocracy (from
genealogical data (Hollingsworth 1977)). Before 1700, there is not much diﬀerence in
adult mortality across social classes. Surprisingly the elites have lower life expectancy;
4This section borrows some material from de la Croix and Sommacal (2009).
8Figure 6: Life expectancy at birth in England
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Table 1: Survival rates in Geneva and Rouen
social Survival probabilities
class 0→15 15→30 30→45
Geneva workers 0.34 0.80 0.70
XVII merchants 0.45 0.84 0.74
nobility 0.61 0.89 0.81
Rouen workers 0.33 0.85 0.87
XVIII merchants 0.49 0.87 0.86
nobility 0.47 0.86 0.84
9this unexpected result is attributed by Johansson (1999) to an urban penalty paid by
the aristocracy for the pleasures and opportunities of city life. The quasi-egalitarian
mortality regime began to change by 1700. Life expectancy rose for all groups but faster
and further for the elite.
In de la Croix and Sommacal (2009) we argue that this picture could be consistent with
a decomposition of the evolution of medical knowledge and life expectancy into three
periods. Before the seventeenth century the eﬀectiveness of medicine was very low. In
fact, medicine was probably not eﬀective at all. Given the low eﬀectiveness of medical
services, doctors hardly managed to increase the life expectancy of their patients. As a
consequence, diﬀerential mortality between the rich (who could aﬀord the services of a
doctor) and the common people was very low, or even non-existent: income was of little
importance in determining life expectancy. Next came a time when medicine became
more eﬀective. The rich were the ﬁrst to beneﬁt from these improvements, and their life
expectancy rose. Diﬀerential mortality started to increase, because the improvements
in longevity still did not beneﬁt the whole population. In the third period there was
a global improvement in health. Medicine became more and more eﬀective, and the
advantage of the upper classes in terms of longevity declined. Diﬀerential mortality
decreased. We will look further into the evolution of medical knowledge over time in the
next section.
Two other data sets can give further hints about mortality by social class before the
Industrial Revolution. They cover the population of two cities in continental Europe,
Geneva (Perrenoud 1975) and Rouen (Bardet 1983). Age-speciﬁc survival probabilities
are presented in Table 1 for three social classes. In both data sets, infant mortality rates
are much lower in the elite groups. This reﬂects their better living conditions. We also
ﬁnd that in Geneva (XVII century) and in Rouen (XVIII century) there was not much
diﬀerence in adult mortality across social classes. In Rouen, there was no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the survival probabilities from age 15 to age 30 or from age 30 to age 45 of
notables and simple workers. This is in line with the English data presented above. In
Geneva, the upper social class had a slight advantage.
5 Rise in Medical knowledge5
We have seen in the previous sections that adult longevity started to improve before the
increase in income per capita related to the Industrial Revolution. The determinants of
the evolution of life expectancy during these centuries have been the subject of lively
discussions in medical history and mortality history. One of the issue concerns the role
of medical science. Remember Galor and Weil citation provided in the introduction:
“Consider the eﬀect of an initial reduction in mortality (due to an exogenous shock
to health technology or to standards of living)...” We are precisely looking for this
exogenous shock.
5This section borrows some material from de la Croix and Sommacal (2009).
10As a matter of medical knowledge, it is certain that ancient ideas persisted a long time in
modern Europe and the conﬁdence of consumers in medicine was low. Popular proverbs
endorsed this distrust: one doctor makes work for another6. As a consequence some
authors claim that the rise of life expectancy in early modern Europe relied more on
changes in immunology and/or improvement in the climate than on human factors such
as medical advances.
Johansson (1999) argues against the traditional therapeutic nihilism that tends to deny
that medicine had any eﬀectiveness before the end of the nineteenth century, and sug-
gested an increase in medical eﬀectiveness as a possible explanation for the change,
documented in Figure 6, from an egalitarian mortality regime to a regime characterized
by a mortality diﬀerential between rich and poor people.
Indeed in the period 1500-1800, medicine showed an increasingly experimental attitude:
no improvement was eﬀected on the grounds of the disease theory (which was still mainly
based on traditional ideas), but signiﬁcant advances were made based on practice and
empirical observations. For example, although the theoretical understanding of how
drugs work only came progressively in the nineteenth century with the development
of chemistry (Weatherall 1996), the eﬀectiveness of the treatment of some important
diseases was improved thanks to the practical use of new drugs coming from the New
World.7 Advances in the treatment of Syphilis were made due to improvements in the
development of condoms. For a long period, mainly due to their high cost, these new
medical advances were only available to rich people 8.
Moreover Table 2, which shows the number of books containing lifestyle advice writ-
ten in the period 1600-1800 by sub-periods, provides some indirect evidence of the fact
that lifestyle advice (concerning, for example, personal and domestic cleanliness) be-
came popular among upper class readers. This trend is also supported by the evidence
provided by Baten and van Zanden (2008) on book production in early modern Europe
from 1450 to 1799.
As suggested by Johansson (1999) the cumulative eﬀects of these improvements could
have produced a net increase in the eﬃcacy of medicine in the eighteenth century. “As
early as 1829 Dr.F.B. Hawkins wrote a book entitled Elements of Medical Statistics,
in which lie described what could be called an early modern epidemiological transition.
Several centuries before his own time leprosy, plague, sweating sickness, ague, typhus,
smallpox, syphilis and scurvy had been leading causes of death. Now all of these diseases
6For further details of the history of medicine: Siraisi (1990) and Porter (1995).
7Ipecacuanha was used for severe dysentery, guaiacum for syphilis, and the bark of the cinchona tree
for malaria. Citrus fruits started to be used in the prevention and treatment of scurvy.
8In the eighteenth century bubonic plague also disappeared from England. The reasons for this are
still hotly debated and some authors explain it in exogenous terms. In any case, independently of this
debate, it should be noticed that by the seventeenth century a ”warning system” had been developed
in London. Weekly bills of mortality, containing the cause of death, were published: when the number
of plague deaths reached a worrying value, foreshadowing the outbreak of an epidemic, people with
enough money to move left the city. This system, though not eﬀective in the treatment of the plague
itself, can be interpreted as a public health measure, that had an eﬀect on the health of rich people.
11had disappeared, could be cured, or treated eﬀectively. At the present scarlet fever,
consumption, gout, dropsy, palsy, apoplexy (including heart attacks and strokes), mania,
and diseases of the brain were the most prevalent causes of death. The last six of the
eight diseases listed were not contagious; they were chronic diseases most likely to strike
older adults”(Johansson 1999, p. 48).
Table 2: Number of books on health published in England, 1600-1800
Period Number of books
1600-24 9
1625-49 16
1650-74 17
1675-99 25
1700-24 28
1725-49 34
1750-74 53
1775-1800 81
We conclude this section with an important remark. Even if advances in medical knowl-
edge and practice (as above, we use this term in a broad sense, to include lifestyle advice)
could be responsible for early improvements in the length of life, this does not mean that
the increase in life expectancy can be explained only by advances in medical science.
Many factors may have contributed to the reduction in mortality since the eighteenth
century (nutrition, medicine, immunology, etc.) and attributing a speciﬁc weight to each
of them is very diﬃcult (Fogel 2004). Medical eﬀectiveness could still be key to explain
the diﬀerential mortality between social classes before the Industrial Revolution.
6 Height of Swedish Soldiers9
Let us now go deeper into one mechanism through which adult longevity could have
increased. From the epidemiology literature we know that providing children with ap-
propriate health care and nutrition and promoting good attitudes towards health ensure
them a longer life when adults (see a survey in Harris (2001)). Starting with Kermack,
McKendrick, and McKinlay (1934), who showed that the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years of life were
central in determining the longevity of the adult, the relationship between early devel-
opment and late mortality within cohorts has been well-established. Another important
contribution in the ﬁeld is that of Barker and Osmond (1986) who related lower child-
hood health status to higher incidence of heart disease in later life. This idea also had
an echo in the literary tradition as witnessed by the aphorism “The Child is Father of
9This section borrows some material from de la Croix and Licandro (2007).
12the Man” (Wordsworth 1802), meaning that the way a child is brought up determines
what he or she will become in the future.
Height is a simple measure of childhood development, since both better nutrition and
lower exposure to infections leads to increased height.10 Height is constant after, say,
the age of 18, but is still a good predictor of life expectancy and mortality in old age.
According to Waaler (1984), the trend towards greater height found in the data means
that younger cohorts, which have grown up with better nutrition, will have better health
and live longer as adults.
Height is a frequently used indicator in microeconomic studies of the relationship between
health and income. Weil (2007) ﬁnds that the eﬀect on wages of an additional centimeter
of height ranges between 3.3% and 9.4%, depending on the data set used. In a second
step, he exploits the correlation between height and direct measures of health such as
the adult survival rate to evaluate health’s role in accounting for income diﬀerences
among countries; he ﬁnds that eliminating health variations would reduce world income
variance by a third.
The height of conscripts has been systematically recorded by the Swedish army since
1820, which provides time-series information on changes in height throughout the de-
mographic transition. Figure 7 presents data11 for the cohorts born between 1760 and
1960. The left panel shows that the height of soldiers (measured at approximately age
20) is highly correlated with the life expectancy of the same generation.12 The right
panel of Figure 7 shows that body height and years of schooling are positively correlated
and, more importantly, that changes in height precede changes in education.
In de la Croix and Licandro (2007) we propose a new theory of the demographic tran-
sition based on the evidence reported above that body development during childhood is
an important predictor of life expectancy. The key and novel mechanism we propose is
that parents face a trade-oﬀ between the quantity of children they have and the amount
they can aﬀord to spend on each of them during childhood. Parents like to have children,
but they also care about their longevity. By ensuring an appropriate physical develop-
ment for their children and protecting them from infections, parents provide them with
greater health capital and a longer life. Such provision is costly though, and its cost is
proportional to the number of children. As a consequence, having many children pre-
vents parents of spending much on their health capital. The proposed quality/quantity
trade-oﬀ makes longevity and fertility negatively related.
10According to Silventoinen (2003), height is a good indicator of childhood living conditions (mostly
family background), not only in developing countries but also in modern Western societies. In poor
societies, the proportion of cross-sectional variation in body height explained by living conditions is
larger than in developed countries, with lower heritability of height as well as larger socioeconomic
diﬀerences in height.
11Sources: Sandberg and Steckel (1997) for height data from 1820; Floud (1984) for height data
before 1820 from Denmark); The “Human Mortality Database” for life expectancy data; and de la
Croix, Lindh, and Malmberg (2008) for education data.
12Notice that this strong correlation over time can also be established in a cross section of countries:
Baten and Komlos (1998) regressed life expectancy at birth on adult height and explained 68% of the
variance for a sample of 17 countries in 1860.
13Figure 7: Height, Life Expectancy and Education in Sweden
40
45
50
55
60
65
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
generations
y
e
a
r
s
164
166
168
170
172
174
176
178
180
c
m
life expectancy at age 10
height of conscripts
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
generations
y
e
a
r
s
164
166
168
170
172
174
176
178
180
182
c
m
years of schooling
height of conscripts
14In our paper, the mechanism relating demographics and growth is the Ben-Porath hy-
pothesis that longevity positively aﬀects education and human capital accumulation,
by extending an individual active life. We assume that adults decide about their own
optimal amount of education, and we take basic education, even if provided by parents,
as being exogenously given. In addition to the trade-oﬀ between the number and de-
velopment of children stressed above, adults face a trade-oﬀ between having children
and improving their own education, which makes the number of children and schooling
negatively related. This is similar to the trade-oﬀ faced by parents in a Beckerian world,
where they care about the quantity and quality (education) of their oﬀsprings.
The dynamics of de la Croix and Licandro (2007)’s model displays the key features of the
demographic transition, including the hump in total net fertility rate and in population
growth. In particular, it is able to replicate the observed rise in life expectancy and
educational attainment, as well as the initial increase and then decline in fertility. If
the mechanisms we describe predominate, the logic of the demographic transition could
well be the reverse of that which is usually assumed: the key trade-oﬀ is not between
fertility and education, with eﬀects on longevity as a byproduct, but between fertility
and healthier and longer living children, with a subsequent eﬀect on education. This
timing is evident in the data presented above.
7 Concluding Remark
The transition from a world of low economic growth with high mortality and high fertility
to one with low mortality and fertility but sustained growth has been the subject of
intensive research in recent years. In this literature, the relation between growth and
fertility results from the quantity/quality trade-oﬀ faced by parents between the number
of children and their education. Indeed, the gradual increase in the observed level of
for human capital during the nineteenth century ’has led researchers to argue that the
increasing role of human capital in the production process induced households to increase
investment in the human capital of their oﬀspring, ultimately leading to the onset of the
demographic transition’ (Galor 2005). If the rise is education was indeed driven by a
stronger demand for skills from the industrial sector, one should have observed a rise in
the skill premium during and following the industrial revolution.
Looking for such evidence, Clark (2005) computes a skill premium over the period 1220-
1990 in two diﬀerent ways. First by measuring the relative wage of all skilled building
workers relative to all laborers and, second, by using only those observations in which
there is a matched pair for the same place and year of wages for craftsmen and laborers.
The two methods lead to the same conclusion: the skill premium did not rise during
the Industrial Revolution. And Clark concludes that ’The market premium for skills,
does not explain the increased investment in human skills evident after 1600.’ Hence, we
might wonder whether the human capital interpretations of the Industrial Revolution
are based on the right trade-oﬀ.
15The evidence provided in this paper points to an alternative mechanism which does not
require any increase in the skill premium (and hence would not be dismissed by Clark’s
data) because it is based on a supply side argument. Rather than grounding the rise in
education on the growing demand for skilled workers from the industry, we argue that
households may have wanted to increase their investment in human skills as a response
to longer lives.
The whole story line could then be as evoked by Galor and Weil (1999): following a
positive shock to health technology, the environment during childhood improved and
adult mortality consequently decreased. This occurred at least for a sub-group of the
population: the upper class, and those living in cities. This raised the expected rate
of return to human capital investments for them, leading to more education, a faster
accumulation of skills, and eventually to a higher rate of productivity growth. This in
turn initiated the transition from Malthusian stagnation to sustained growth.
References
Bairoch, Paul, Jean Batou, and Pierre Ch` evre. 1988. The population of European Cities
from 800 to 1850. Gen` eve: CIEH.
Bardet, Jean-Pierre. 1983. Rouen au XVIIe et XVIIIe si` ecles. Edited by SEDES. Paris.
Barker, David, and Clive Osmond. 1986. “Infant mortality, childhood nutrition, and
ischaemic heart disease in England and Wales.” Lancet i:1077–1088.
Baten, Joerg, and John Komlos. 1998. “Review: Height and the Standard of Living.”
The Journal of Economic History 58 (3): 866–870.
Baten, Joerg, and Jan Luiten van Zanden. 2008. “Book production and the onset of
modern economic growth.” Journal of Economic Growth, p. forthcoming.
Beltrami, D. 1951. “Lineamenti di storia della popolazione di Venezia nei secoli XVI,
XVII e XVIII.” Atti dell’Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, vol. 109.
Ben-Porath, Yoram. 1967. “The production of human capital and the life-cycle of
earnings.” Journal of Political Economy 75 (4): 352–365.
Bloom, David E., and Jeﬀrey G. Williamson. 1998. “Demographic Transitions and
Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia.” World Bank Economic Review 12 (3): 419–
455 (September).
Boucekkine, Raouf, David de la Croix, and Omar Licandro. 2002. “Vintage human
capital, demographic trends and endogenous growth.” Journal of Economic Theory
104:340–375.
. 2003. “Early mortality declines at the dawn of modern growth.” Scandinavian
Journal of Economics 105 (3): 401–418.
Boucekkine, Raouf, David de la Croix, and Dominique Peeters. 2007. “Early Literacy
Achievements, Population Density, and the Transition to Modern Growth.” Journal
of the European Economic Association 5 (1): 183–226 (03).
16Cervellati, Matteo, and Uwe Sunde. 2005. “Human Capital Formation, Life Expectancy
and the Process of Development.” American Economic Review 95 (5): 1653–1672.
Clark, Gregory. 2005. “The Condition of the Working Class in England, 1209-2004.”
Journal of Political Economy 113 (6): 1307–1340.
Cordoba, Juan Carlos, and Mar Ripoll. 2008. “Life Expectancy and The Wealth of
Nations.” paper presented at SED 2008, Boston.
de la Croix, David, and Omar Licandro. 1999. “Life expectancy and endogenous
growth.” Economics Letters 65 (2): 255–263.
. 2007. “The Child is Father of the Man: Implications for the Demographic
Transition.” Discussion paper 6493, CEPR.
de la Croix, David, Thomas Lindh, and Bo Malmberg. 2008. “Swedish Economic
Growth and Education Since 1800.” Canadian Journal of Economics 41:166–185.
. 2009. “Demographic change and economic growth in Sweden: 17502050.”
Journal of Macroeconomics, p. forthcoming.
de la Croix, David, and Alessandro Sommacal. 2009. “A Theory of Medical Eﬀec-
tiveness, Diﬀerential Mortality, Income Inequality and Growth for Pre-Industrial
England.” Mathematical Population Studies, p. forthcoming.
Edvinsson, Rodney. 2005. Growth, Accumulation, Crisis. Volume 41 of Stockholm
Studies in Economic History. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International. PhD
thesis.
Floud, Roderick. 1984, April. “The Heights of Europeans Since 1750: A New Source For
European Economic History.” Working paper 1318, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc.
Fogel, Robert. 2004. The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700-2100.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fridlizius, Gunnar. 1985. “The mortalty decline in the ﬁrst phase of the demographic
transition: Swedish experiences.” In Pre-industrial population change, edited by
Tommy Bengtsson, Gunnar Fridlizius, and Rolf Ohlsson, 71–114. Stockholm:
Almquist and Wiksell International.
Galor, Oded. 2005. “From Stagnation to Growth: Uniﬁed Growth Theory.” Chapter 4
of Handbook of Economic Growth, edited by Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf,
Volume 1 of Handbook of Economic Growth, 171–293. Elsevier.
Galor, Oded, and David Weil. 1999. “From Malthusian stagnation to modern growth.”
American Economic Review 89 (2): 150–154.
Harris, Bernard. 2001. “‘The child is father of man.’ The relationship between child
health and adult mortality in the 19th and 20th centuries.” International Journal
of Epidemiology 30:688–696.
Hazan, Moshe, and Hosny Zoabi. 2006. “Does longevity cause growth? A theoretical
critique.” Journal of Economic Growth 11:363–376.
17Hofsten, Erland, and Hans Lundstr¨ om. 1976. Swedish population history: main trends
from 1750 to 1970. Stockholm: LiberF¨ orlag.
Hollingsworth, Thomas. 1977. “Mortality in the British peerage families since 1600.”
Population 32:323–352.
Johansson, Ryan. 1999. “Death and the doctors: medicine and elite mortality in
Britain from 1500 to 1800.” Cambridge Group for the History of Population and
Social Structure Working Paper Series. No. 7.
Kermack, William, Anderson McKendrick, and P McKinlay. 1934. “Death Rates in
Great Britain and Sweden: some general regularities and their signiﬁcance.” Lancet
i:698–703.
Lagerloef, Nils-Petter. 2003. “From Malthus to modern growth: can epidemics explain
the three regimes ?” International Economic Review 44 (2): 755–777.
Lindahl, Erik, Einar Dahlgren, and Karin Kock. 1937. National Income of Sweden
1861-1930, Part One and Two. Volume III of Wages, Cost of Living and National
Income of Sweden, 1860-1930. London: P.S. King & Son, Ltd.
Nicolini, Esteban. 2004. “Mortality, interest rates, investment, and agricultural produc-
tion in 18th century England.” Explorations in Economic History 41 (2): 130–155.
Perrenoud, Alfred. 1975. “L’in´ egalit´ e sociale devant la mort ` a Gen` eve au XVIIe si‘ecle.”
Population 30:221–243.
. 1978. “La mortalit´ e ` a Gen` eve de 1625 ` a 1825.” Annales de d´ emographie
historique, pp. 209–233.
. 1985. “Mortalty decline in its secular setting.” In Pre-industrial population
change, edited by Tommy Bengtsson, Gunnar Fridlizius, and Rolf Ohlsson, 41–69.
Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell International.
Porter, Roy. 1995. Disease, medicine, and society in England, 1550-1860. New Studies
in Economic and Social History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sandberg, Lars, and Richard Steckel. 1997. “Was Industrialization Hazardous to your
Health? Not in Sweden.” In Health and Welfare during Industrialization, edited by
Richard Steckel and Roderick Floud. University of Chicago Press.
Silventoinen, Karri. 2003. “Determinants of Variation in Adult Body Height.” Journal
of Biosocial Science 35:263–285.
Siraisi, Nancy. 1990. Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to
Knowledge and Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Soares, Rodrigo R. 2005. “Mortality Reductions, Educational Attainment, and Fertility
Choice.” American Economic Review 95 (3): 580–601 (June).
Waaler, Hans. 1984. “Height, weight and mortality: the Norwegian experience.” Acta
medica Scandinavica. Supplementum 679:1–56.
Weatherall, Miles. 1996. “Drug treatment and the rise of pharmacology.” In Cambridge
Illustrated History: Medicine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18Weil, David. 2007. “Accounting for the Eﬀect of Health on Economic Growth.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, p. forthcoming.
Weisdorf, Jacob L. 2004. “From stagnation to growth: Revisiting three historical
regimes.” Journal of Population Economics 17 (3): 455–472 (08).
Wordsworth, William. 1802. My heart leaps up when I behold. Poem.
Wrigley, Edward, Ros Davies, James Oeppen, and Roger Schoﬁeld. 1997. English
Population History from Family Reconstitution: 1580–1837. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Wrigley, Edward, and Roger Schoﬁeld. 1989. The population history of England, 1541–
1871: a reconstruction. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.
19